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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small countrys econ-
omy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and
infrastructure competition within a di¤erential game framework between two un-
equally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic
that small states are more exible in their political decision making than larger
countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited
institutional capacity in the provision of public goods. The model shows that the
long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of
capital mobility. In particular, we show that exibility mitigates against - but does
not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that
the benecial e¤ect of exibility in a small state increases with its ine¢ ciency in
providing public infrastructure and with the degree of international openness.
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1 Introduction
Small states generally su¤er from limited access to capital and labor resources, both in
amount and in variety. Foreign production factors can be an important way to ll in this
gap. Foreign direct investments (in short, FDI, hereafter) can contribute signicantly to
the development of small states (Read, 2008). In fact, small economies tend to have high
level of access to private foreign capital as a ratio of total capital formation (Streeten, 1993).
Indeed, using data from the World Bank, Figure 1 suggests that the ratio of FDI ows to
the gross xed capital formation is higher in small countries (i.e., population less than two
million1) than in large countries (i.e., population in excess of 30 million2). Moreover, the
economic well-being of small countries is positively correlated with the ratio of FDIs. The
data in Figure 1 indicate that small countries above the average line, such as Luxembourg,
Malta, Cyprus or Estonia, exhibit a high level of per capita GDP, whereas small countries
below this threshold have a lower level of per capita GDP. This is conrmed in Figure 2,
which suggests that a direct relationship exists between the level of GDP per capita and
foreign investments3 in small economies. In the cluster of larger countries, however, this
relationship is hardly apparent. Countries, such as Poland, Italy, Turkey, India and Spain
appear above the threshold in Figure 1, whereas the USA, Ukraine, Nepal, Greece among
others, are situated below it4.
Given these facts, this paper analyzes the impact of foreign investment ows on the
economic performance of a small country competing internationally for mobile production
factors. In this context, we investigate the conditions by which the economies of such
countries can be viable, or even expand, in the long term. To that end, we develop a
dynamic framework to study how a small country attracts foreign capital through two
policy instruments, namely taxes and public infrastructure5.
1Our data set contains 51 countries with population less than 2 million. This represents 72% of all
the existing "small" countries. An exhaustive description cannot be provided due to a lack of relevant
information.
2Our data set of countries with population in excess of 30 million is exhaustive. It contains 41 countries.
3Note that, we have not controlled for other determinants of per capita GDP; for example, the avail-
ability of natural resources. Taking into account oil reserves and the recent increase in oil prices would
explain the position of Qatar or Brunei in our gures.
4The ambiguous role of FDIs on the economic performance of countries is documented in the literature
(see, for example Alfaro et al. 2004).
5These public goods contribute to the domestic attractiveness of private capital, as they are supposed to
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For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two competing countries of uneven size. In this
study, size is dened as number of capital-owners in a respective country and these capital
owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. By adopting this approach, our
model focuses on the economic size of a country.
The dynamic aspect of international competition is addressed by a di¤erential game
framework in which the strategic behavior of the small country di¤ers from that of its
larger rival. We account for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more
exible in their political decision making than much larger countries (see, in particular,
Streeten, 1993).
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Figure 1: Relationship between the ratio of FDIs to Gross Fixed Capital Formation and
population from 2000-2010. Source: World Bank
enhance private productivity. Examples of this are transportation infrastructure, universities and public
R&D investment, but also property rights enforcement, capital market regulation, and labor and envi-
ronmental regulation. It follows that countries attractiveness may also be due to the quality of their
institutions. In the Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship (2007), it is argued that the abundance of
entrepreneurs in a country depends on the existence of regulations, property rights, accounting standards
and disclosure requirements, among other factors. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a surge
of national and cross-country studies relating economic development to institutions, especially institutions
a¤ecting capital market development and functionality (see, for example, La Porta et al.,1997).
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Figure 2 : Relationship between GDP per capita of small countries and the ratio of FDIs
to Gross Fixed Capital Formation from 2000-2010. Source: World Bank
We thus assume that the small country adopts a Markovian feed-back behavior (i.e.,
the policy variables are continuously reset in response to the dynamics of the states of
the world), whereas the larger country chooses an open-loop rule (i.e., the policy variables
are set only once at the initial time). We also acknowledge that small size is associated
with handicaps, as, small economies are generally characterized by limited institutional
capacity in the provision of public goods (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000) relative to
large countries. Finally, we assume that the capital owners living in both countries have
heterogeneous attitudes toward their attachment to home. Thus, they incur costs related to
moving abroad. The extend of these costs depends on their attitudes toward their countries.
Additionally, their decision to relocate their capital is a¤ected by capital taxation and by
productivity-enhancing public infrastructure.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model shows
that GDP, in particular the GDP per capita, of the small country increases with the ow of
FDIs, which is consistent with the facts presented above. Moreover, the long-run solutions
show that the economy of the small country can expand, shrink or even collapse. In
this context, two cases can be distinguished; one exhibits high international openness and
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another exhibits low international openness. The fundamental di¤erence between these
cases is that the small country will only experience economic collapse if capital mobility
is high (i.e., high international openness). However, higher e¢ ciency in the provision of
public infrastructure can partially countervail this e¤ect by decreasing the likelihood of
collapse. In the second case, when capital mobility is low, international competition for
capital can eventually reduce the size of the small economy without provoking its collapse.
If capital mobility is very low, the model shows that international competition tends to
expand the economy of the small country. We also assess the extent to which exibility
is benecial to the small country, given that it su¤ers from limited institutional capacity.
By comparing the Markovian and open-loop outcomes, we nd that exibility mitigates
against - but not eliminate- the likelihood of a small economy collapse. Finally, we show
that exibility (and its associated benets) increases in tandem with the ine¢ ciency of
public infrastructure provision and with the degree of international openness in the small
country.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we pro-
vide a dynamic counterpart to previous static papers in which countries compete with two
instruments. Following Tiebouts seminal work (1956), there has been a growing body
of literature on the joint role of taxes and public inputs in attracting mobile production
factors. For example, Zissimos and Wooders (2008) analyze how the provision of public
goods designed to reduce the production cost of private rms is able to relax international
tax competition between governments of equal size. Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) provide
an empirical analysis of the impact of taxes and public infrastructure on the allocation of
private capital. They nd that both corporate taxes and public capital contribute signi-
cantly to inward FDIs. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) propose a two-stage game in which both
a small and large jurisdiction compete for capital using taxes and public goods as policy
variables. These contributions are, however static and thus unable to provide insights into
dynamic outcomes. Di¤erential games have already been applied to model conditions of
oligopolistic competition (Dockner and Jorgensen, 1984, Karp and Perlo¤, 1993, Ceillini
and Lambertini, 2004); however, few studies have applied di¤erential games to tax compe-
tition. For example, Coates (1993) deals with the issue of property tax competition and
partially analyzes6 the open-loop equilibrium of a dynamic game. Secondly, by assuming
6As mentioned by Cardarelli (2002).
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that small countries are more exible in taking decisions than their larger rivals but at a
higher institutional cost as explained above, we account for behavioral and institutional
asymmetries which, to the best of our knowledge, are not considered in the traditional tax
competition literature.
Unlike Alesina and Spolaore (1997), we regard the political size of a country as ex-
ogenously given. However, we note that the economic magnitude expressed in terms of
productive resources can vary endogenously as a consequence of public policy and inter-
national competition. Similar to our model, the contribution of de la Croix and Dottori
(2008) is also concerned with the collapse of a community. To explain the tragedy of Easter
Island, these authors show how a closed system can collapse as a result of non-cooperative
bargaining between clans. The context and the methodology of their paper is, however,
di¤erent from ours, given that since they use an overlapping generations model in which
people live for two periods and have competing fertility rates.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section models the dynamic competition
between two countries of asymmetric size. In Section 3, we derive long-run solutions and
Section 4 analyzes the long-run conditions of a small country. The importance of exibility
in small economies is assessed in Section 5 and Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2 The model
Suppose that the world is composed of two countries (regions) with unequal populations.
Country size may be dened by population, area, or national income (Streeten, 1993). In
this study, population, rather than area, is used to dene country size. More precisely, size
is dened with respect to the number of capital owners who populate the country and these
capital owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. By adopting this approach,
our model identies a country by the size of its economy. Furthermore, capital owners (an
their associated activites) are free to relocate to the neighbor country at any point in time.
At time t = 0; capital ows have not yet taken place, so the population size in each country
coincides with its native population.
At t = 0; the population of jurisdictions is evenly distributed with unit density on the
interval [ S1(0); S2(0)]. The small country extends from  S1(0) to the origin 0; and the
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rest of the world extends from 0 to S2(0). It follows that the small economy has a size of
S1(0) , and the rest of the world has a size of S2(0), with S1(0) < S2(0). We assume that
the total number of rms is constant over time and is normalized to one. Thus, for any
future time t  0, S1(t) = S(t) and S2(t) = 1  S(t).
Entrepreneurs Each citizen is endowed with one unit of capital which is combined
with her labor to establish a rm. Therefore, all citizens are self-employed entrepreneurs.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we thus use rms and entrepreneurs interchangeably.
The rms are distributed at their respective sub-interval according to their disposition
to establish a rm outside of their home location. As in Ogura (2006), we assume that
this population of entrepreneurs is heterogeneous in the degree of their attachment to the
home country7. Within the model, we dictate that the closer entrepreneurs are located to
extremes of the interval, the more they are attached to their current location. Conversely,
the closer that rms are to the border 0, the less they are attached to their territory,
and the easier it will be for them to relocate abroad8. This means that a rm of type
 2 [ S1(0); 0] located in the home country incurs a disutility of relocating abroad equal
to kx, where x is the distance between 0 and . The coe¢ cient k represents the unit cost of
moving capital abroad and can also be interpreted as the degree of international openness.
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we assume that each rm produces q + ai (i = 1; 2)
units of a nal good, where q is the private component of (gross) productivity. The fraction
ai of the produced good depends on the public input supplied by the home (i.e., foreign)
jurisdiction9. Note that the product Si  (q + ai) represents the total output or GDP
produced in country i = 1; 2. This implies that q + ai is the per capita output in a
respective country. The total output is sold in a competitive (world) market at a given
price normalized to one. Thus, we suppose that both countries have equal access to a
7This technique was rst considered in the scal competition research of Mansoorian and Myers (1993).
8For reasons of simplicity, we assume that rms can only relocate to their neighboring jurisdiction.
9Public input satises the local public good characteristics; that is, it is jointly used without rivalry
by rms located within the same jurisdiction. It follows that the benets and costs of these goods only
accrue at the jurisdictional level. As in Zissimoss and Wooders (2008), we abstract congestion costs .
Incorporating congestion into the model would complicate our framework without qualitatively improving
the results. Moreover, if public input represents immaterial goods as laws and regulations (e.g., protecting
intellectual property and, specifying accurate rules for dispute resolution), the lack of congestion in our
model is justied by the particular nature of these goods.
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common market. This also implies that the smaller jurisdiction does not su¤er from a
reduced home market. We further consider that the unit production cost is constant and
equal to zero without loss of generality. Each entrepreneur pays a tax on capital10 which
is denoted by Ti (i = 1; 2) and levied in the country i = 1; 2.
The temporal perspective of the setting described above is as follows. For each period
t 2 [t;+1) and for any t > 0, governments update their choices in terms of the public
goods and taxes o¤ered 11.
Suppose that an entrepreneur of type x(t) is initially located in the small country and
considers staying at home or investing her physical capital abroad. If she decides not to
move, her prot is given by12
1(t) = q(t) + a1(t)  T1(t): (1)
If she invests abroad, her prot becomes
2(t) = q(t) + a2(t)  T2(t)  kx(t):
It follows that the marginal entrepreneur x who is indi¤erent between investing abroad
and staying at home veries the condition
q(t) + a1(t)  T1(t) = q(t) + a2(t)  T2(t)  kx(t):
Consequently, we obtain
x(t; a1; a2; T1; T2) =
a2(t)  T2(t)
k
  a1(t)  T1(t)
k
: (2)
In other words, the large country attracts capital (x > 0) from the smaller jurisdiction if
the net gain of investing abroad, a2(t)   T2(t); is higher than the net gain of staying at
home, a1(t)  T1(t) after taking into account the mobility cost kx. If x < 0, capital moves
from the large jurisdiction to the smaller one.
10Given that each entrepreneur invests exactly one unit of capital in our model, the total tax will be Ti
(i = 1; 2).
11Notice that we do not consider investments as sunk costs, or we assume that the time period t is long
enough to make sunk costs irrelevant.
12For the sake of simplicity, we consider that q is such that the prot of each rm is positive for all
equilibrium levels of public goods and taxes.
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The motion equation of the size of the small countrys economy S(t) is given by
_S(t) =  x = a1(t)  T1(t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k
: (3)
We further assume that the preferences for the home location will change according to the
relative attractiveness of the competing jurisdictions in the following way. For the rms
that do not move, attachment to home will increase by x if the small economy is attractive
to foreign investors (x < 0), and it will decrease if the foreign location attracts capital from
the small country (x > 0). For the capital owners who relocate abroad, the attachment to
the new location increase as the attachment to their country of origin decreases.
Governments Adopting a public-choice perspective, we posit that the governments
maximize tax revenue 13. To this end, the countries compete simultaneously by using taxes
and public infrastructure to attract entrepreneurs, and rms decide where to locate based
on these government policies. We suppose that the e¤ective (net) tax revenue collected
by the governments does not coincide with the gross amount of tax revenue collected.
Following Vaillancourt (1989) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), tax collection is costly
due to the administration, monitoring and enforcing procedures associated with it (Kenny
and Winer, 2006). If the marginal cost of collecting taxes rises, then the net tax revenue
R(t) at time t is a convex function of the collected taxes. For tractability reasons, the net
tax revenue will be given by Ri =
p
SiTi.
The instantaneous objective function of government i(i = 1; 2) is thus given by the
following:
wi(Ti; ai) =
p
SiTi   i
2
a2i ; (4)
where the second term is the cost of providing public inputs, which is assumed quadratic
for tractability, whereas i is a country specic e¢ ciency parameter. Indeed, the higher
the value of i, the higher the unit and marginal costs of providing public infrastructure
will be.
13This assumption should not be interpreted in the classical sense given by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) and applied to Leviathan governments. We do not consider here that regulators are self-interested
governments. We simply assume that collected taxes are used for public goods that do not directly a¤ect
the productivity of rms, such as like green spaces, swimming pools, and security bodies.
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The key focus of this paper is the long-run behavior of small states. To this end, we
highlight two opposing features of small open economies.
First, according to the Commonwealth Secretariat (2000), the public sector of mini-
states generally su¤ers from limited institutional capacity.14 Moreover, it may be di¢ cult
for small states to recruit high-quality civil servants given their limited pool of candi-
dates(Streeten, 1993). These factors can reduce the e¢ ciency and increase the unit costs
for the provision of public services. To account for these facts, we assume that 1   > 2:
Normalizing 2 to 1; we impose  > 1.
Secondly, small size can be considered an asset (Kuznets, 1960; Easterly and Kray, 2000)
given the economic success of many micro-states. Streeten (1993) suggests that problems
related to collective action can be solved more easily in small countries15, whereas the
larger jurisdiction is not able or not willing to attain this degree of exibility in its decision
making16. To capture this di¤erence, we assume that the large jurisdiction commits to
a policy path that was adopted at the beginning of the game (i.e., open-loop strategy),
whereas policy-makers in the small jurisdiction adopt a Markovian feed-back strategy.
This mixed representation o¤ers a convenient way of modeling di¤erences in exibility
of decision making (Dockner et al., 2000). Although small in a political sense, the mini-
state can grow larger as a result of sustained capital inows. The small countrys size
could thus exceed a critical threshold that would cause the large country to react more
aggressively by also adopting a Markovian strategy. To rule out such a behavioral change,
we assume that the size of the small countrys economy will be bounded from above so
that it never will be larger than that of the rival economy. Therefore, we impose that
S(t)  S < 1
2
for any t  0, where S is an upper bound. Without the loss of generality,
we shall assume that the bound is S = 1
2
.
14In small states, the median wage bill of the public sector as a proportion of GDP is 31 percent, whereas
the ratio is 21 percent in large developing countries (Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank, 2000).
15These attributes facilitate greater single-mindedness and focus on economic policy-making and a more
rapid and e¤ective response to exogenous change (Armstrong and Read, 1995). Hence, in the present
paper, we assume that the small economy updates its decision variables at each period t and is thus able
to condition its actions based on current observations.
16This could result from the higher costs of social and political heterogeneity. Indeed, after having
reached a policy consensus, changing this policy could be a very sensitive issue in a large country. Moreover,
the extremely small size of the mini-state may inuence thus, given that the large economy may consider
it to be unimportant.
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The dynamic objective-functions of the competing jurisdictions are respectively
J1 = max
a1;T1
Z +1
0
e rtw1(T1(S; t); a1(S; t))dt; (5)
J2 = max
a2;T2
Z +1
0
e rtw2(T2(t); a2(t))dt; (6)
where r is the discount rate of the public decision-makers, which should reect the degree
of impatience of the population. Given that there is no evidence that this rate is dependent
on the size of a population, we accept that r is common to both jurisdictions.
3 Steady states and the long-run policy mix
As explained above, we assume that the small jurisdiction adopts a Markovian strategy, and
its larger rival chooses an open-loop approach17 when designing its optimal decision path.
In the appendix we provide the full solution to this game. The steady state production
potential of the small country is
S^ =
(kr) 
3
2
6
p
2
 p
2

  1
!
+
2
3
:
Note that this steady state is saddle point stable and there is one monotonically con-
vergent18 path leading to it.
To guarantee that the production potential of the small country remains smaller than
S = 1
2
in the long term, we impose that k < k =
 
1
2
 1
3 1
r
and  >  =
p
2
1 p2(kr) 32
. The long
17In the present framework, we choose only one heterogenous strategic Nash equilibrium (denition
is given in the Appendix.), rather than taking into account all of the possible strategies. Moreover, the
strategy under analysis is not subgame perfect, although it is a non-degenerate Markovian Nash equilibrium
(See the Appendix for details).
18We present the convergence path in the appendix.
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run policy mix of countries related to taxes and public infrastructure is
ba1 = 1
2

1
kr
 1
2
; bT1 = krbS;
ba2 = 1
2

1
2kr
 1
2
; bT2 = 2kr(1  bS):
These values allow us to dene bai + q as the long-run per capita GDP of country i = 1; 2.
According to the above solutions, it is possible to show that the variable bai 19 increases
with the long-term size of the economy S^: Given that S^ is positively related to FDI inows,
our model is consistent with a stylized fact we highlighted in Figure 2, in which the per
capita output of small economies improves with inward foreign investments20. This positive
relationship results from public spending on infrastructure, which impacts the productivity
of rms and, thus, a¤ects the attractiveness of the location to foreign investments.
We also easily verify that ba2 ba1 = 14  p2   2q 1kr > 0 for  > p2 and bT2   bT1 =
kr

2  3bS > 0, given that bS < 1
2
. In other words, the small economy will always be tax
competitive but its public infrastructure will never be attractive to investors. This result is
reminiscent of the ndings reported in the literature on tax competition among economies
of uneven size (Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991,Kanbur and Keen, 1993, Trandel, 1994),
according to which the benet of smallness translates into the ability to undercut the tax
rates of larger countries. Contrary to research on inter-jurisdictional competition ( based on
taxes and public infrastructure), our model does not generate an equilibrium, which occurs
when the small economy has higher taxe than its larger rival (Hindriks et al., 2008, Pieretti
and Zanaj, 2011). This does not occur because the small country is at a disadvantage in
providing public infrastructures due to the limited capacity of its public sector.
Furthermore, the less e¢ cient the small country is in providing public infrastructure,
the more it will implement attractive tax policy. Indeed, the gaps ba2  ba1 and bT2  bT1 rise
with . It should be noted that increasing international openness (lower k) has the same
e¤ect as rising  on both gaps. Thus, the higher the capital mobility, the more the small
country will be inclined to undercut the tax rates of its rival.
19The steady-state value a^i written as a function of S^ is a^i = 3kr(S^i   23 ) + ( 12kr )
1
2 . It follows that
@a^i
@S^i
> 0 is always true.
20In other words, we see that the level of GDP, the GDP per capita and the production potential of the
small country in particular increase with the ow of FDIs.
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Finally, if the long-run solutions have to guarantee non-negative net budget constraints
of both economies, the following two conditions must hold. Either (a) k > k  k with
k = ( 1
32
)
1
3
1
r
, or (b) k veries k < k  k, with k =   1
50
 1
3 1
r
and  satises  <   , with
 = 1
2
p
2 16(kr) 32
. The budget constraint of the large country will be satised if bw1  0, as
there are less stringent conditions on the parameters of the large country than its smaller
rival 21.
4 Will small states survive in the long run?
In this section, we focus our attention on the conditions under which the production po-
tential of the small economy will expand22 (1
2
> S^ > S(0) ), shrink (S^ < S(0) ) or even
collapse (S^ = 0). Two cases can be considered according to the degree of capital mobility.
Case 1 High degree of international openness: k < k < k.
In this case, the survival of the small economy depends on its relative e¢ ciency in
providing public goods. Two sub-cases can be distinguished: one in which capital mobility
is very high, i.e., k < k < ks with23ks =
1
2 [2 + S(0)])
2
3
1
r
, and a second one in which capital
mobility is moderately high, i.e., ks < k < k. In the rst sub-case, it is readily veried
that the small economy expands in the long run, bS > S(0), if  < . However, if the
relative e¢ ciency of provision of public infrastructure in the small economy is too low (i.e.,
if  > ), it will collapse. Furthermore, as the mobility cost approaches its lower bound
k, the small country is more likely to collapse. This occurs because the small economy has
to lower its taxes to such an extent that it can no longer sustain its public expenditures
(bw1 = 0). There are two extreme outcomes in the long-run. Either the small economy
expands, or collapses. Therefore, if it shrinks, it must collapse.
This extreme scenario changes in the second sub-case. According to the values taken by
, the small economy can expand, collapse and shrink without collapsing. If  < s with
21It also appears that bS 2 0; 12 in both (a) and (b).
22We impose (see proof in Appendix A.3) that S(t)  S < 12 . If so,  would depend on the upper bound
of S. Thus, (S) =
p
2
1+6
p
2(S  23 )(kr)
3
2
, in which S is decreasing.
23It is readily veried that ks < k if 0 < S(0) < 12 .
13
s =
p
2
1 6p2[ 23 S(0)](kr)
3
2
, it will expand, and if  > , it will collapse. For an intermediate
e¢ ciency value, i.e., s <  < , the small country will shrink but still survive.
The following proposition can then be stated:
Proposition 1 Assume that international openness is high. The economy of the small
country can expand if it is relatively e¢ cient in providing public infrastructure. Otherwise,
its economy will shrink or even collapse in the long run.
In a world of mobile capital, a small economy may have di¢ culty surviving even if it
is able to adapt to change more quickly than larger countries. This can occur because
the e¢ cient provision of infrastructure and capital mobility are crucial to generating the
resources necessary to a¤ord further public amenities. In fact, the model shows that below
a given threshold, rising capital mobility causes the small economy to cut its taxes to such
an extent that its budgetary resources vanish. It follows that small states, but especially
micro-states, can secure their status in a global economy if their public sectors provide
public infrastructure with su¢ cient e¢ ciency and if their tax rates are more favorable
than those of larger countries. At best, this is a necessary condition for attracting foreign
capital, or at least, surviving.
Case 2 Low degree of international openness: k > k > k.
In this case, the relative ine¢ ciency of the provision of public goods can no longer lead
to the collapse of an economy because budget resources are not constrained. Formally,
the limit value  tends to 1 if k approaches k. This is in marked contrast with the rst
case, as - in this case- a low degree of nancial openness makes capital more captive and
provides su¢ cient tax revenues to cover infrastructural costs. At worst, the economy of
the small country can contract (0 < bS < S(0)). This occurs if bk > k > k and  > s,
with bk = ( 1
8[2 3S(0)])2 )
1
3
1
r
. However, if mobility is very low, i.e., k > k > bk, the small
economy will attract foreign capital and thus expand. Surprisingly, this scenario occurs
independently of the level of ine¢ ciency.
We conclude with the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 Assume that international openness is low. The small countrys economic
size never collapses but may shrink if the degree of international openness is not su¢ ciently
low. In either case, the survival of the economy is independent of the e¢ ciency of public
infrastructure provision.
We provide a summary illustration of the di¤erent cases with respect to the parameter
values of k and  in Figure 3.
Figure 3 : The evolution of the small countrys economic potential according to the
mobility cost (k) and the degree of public ine¢ ciency ().
5 How important is exibility to the small economy?
To assess how benecial exibility is to the small country, we rst calculate the long-run
production potential eS of the small country if it chooses an open-loop behavior identical
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to its larger rival. We thus obtain
eS=(kr)  32
4
(
1

  1) + 1
2
:
The e¤ect of exibility can be represented by the di¤erence bS  eS, which is obtained by
comparing the Markovian and open-loop outcomes. It is easy to verify that this di¤erence
is always non-negative. Therefore, given the same parameters, the Markovian behavior
adopted by the small country is preferable to the open-loop behavior. However, exibility
does not completely eliminate the potential for collapse; it only makes its occurrence less
likely.
Given that
@(bS eS)
@
> 0, the advantage of the small countrys exibility increases with
its ine¢ ciency to provide public infrastructure. In other words, the economic size of the
small country is more sensitive to an increase in e¢ ciency ( decreases) in the Markovian
scenario24. Consequently, exibility counterbalances ine¢ ciency, and the more ine¢ cient a
small country is in providing public inputs, the more valuable exibility is to its long-run
survival.
Furthermore, higher capital mobility increases the relative advantage of exibility, given
that
@(bS eS)
@k
< 0. Note that increased capital mobility reduces (k increases) the long-term
economic potential of the small economy; however, this occurs to a lesser extent in the
Markovian scenario. It follows that exibility countervails the negative e¤ect of high capital
mobility, and exibility brings greater benets to the small country when capital mobility
is low. So, we can conclude by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The positive e¤ect of exibility decreases with the small countrys e¢ ciency
to provide public infrastructures and increases with capital mobility.
We nally observe that similar to the Markovian scenario, the small country never col-
lapses by adopting an open-loop behavior when capital mobility is su¢ ciently low. How-
ever, this condition becomes more restrictive in the open-loop scenario. Indeed, the absence
of exibility in policy making requires now that the mobility cost is higher than 25 k, which
exceeds the threshold k corresponding to the Markovian case.
24In fact, it is convenient to verify that
@ bS@  < @ eS@ .
25It is convenient to show that k = ( 14 )
1
3
1
r .
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether a small open economy can survive in the long-
run when facing global competition. To this end, we model the dynamic competition
between two unequally sized economies. The policy makers of these two countries compete
simultaneously by taxing mobile capital and o¤ering public infrastructure. Firms choose
to locate their capital in the country where their prots are maximized. We characterize
the heterogenous behaviors of the two governments within a di¤erential game framework,
in which the small state adopts Markovian (i.e., exible) behavior, and its larger rival
commits to a strategy developed at the initial time point (i.e., open-loop behavior).
The results show that under conditions of high capital mobility, the small economy
will risk economic collapse if it provides public infrastructure ine¢ ciently. When capital
mobility is very low, the economy of the small state always expands despite its limited
institutional capacity.
However, further research is needed. In the present study, countries are treated solely
as maximizers of tax revenue, and this over-emphasizes the role of tax rates in the long-run
outcomes. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyze a scenario in which governments are
welfare maximizers and take into account the well-being of their populations. The present
paper also models the private sector in an elementary way. Countries are undi¤erentiated in
their ability to produce private goods and the production process is static. Future research
should thus consider how international competition is able to impact the growth process
of these competing economies when private productivity di¤ers between jurisdictions.
References
[1] Alesina A. and E. Spolaore , 1997. On the Number and Size of Nations. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 112(4): 1027-56.
[2] Alfaro L, A. Chanda, S. Kalemli-Ozcan, and S. Sayek, 2004. FDI and Economic
Growth: The role of local nancial markets. Journal of International Economics, 64(1):
89-112.
17
[3] Armstrong H.W. and R. Read, 1995. Western European Micro-states and EU au-
tonomous Regions: the Advantages of Size and Sovereignty. World Development,
23(7):1229-1245.
[4] Benassy-Quere A., N. Golalraja and A. Tronnoy, 2007. Tax and public input compe-
tition. Economic Policy: 385-430.
[5] Blumenthal, M. and J. Slemrod, 1992. The compliance cost of the U.S. individual tax
system: a second look after tax reform, National Tax Journal, 45(2): 186-202.
[6] Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan,1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of
a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Bucovetsky S., 1991. Asymmetric Tax Competition, Journal of Urban Economics, 30,
167181.
[8] Cardarelli R., E. Taugourdeau, J.P. Vidal, 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax
competition. Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 1938.
[9] Casson M., Y. Bernard, B. Anuradha, and W. Nigil, 2006. The Oxford Handbook of
Entrepreneurship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10] Cellini R. and L. Lambertini, 2004. Dynamic oligopoly with sticky prices: closed-loop,
feedback, and open-loop solutions, Journal of Dynamical and Control Systems. Vol.
10, No. 3: 303-314.
[11] Coates D., 1993. Property tax competition in a repeated game. Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 23:111 119.
[12] De la Croix D. and D. Dottori, 2008. Easter Islands collapse: a tale of a population
race. Journal of Economic Growth, 13:2755.
[13] Dockner, E. J., S. Jorgensen, N.V. Long, and G. Sorger, 2000. Di¤erential Games in
Economics and Management Science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[14] Dockner E. and S. Jorgensen S., 1984. Cooperative and non-cooperative di¤erential
game solutions to and investment and pricing problem. J. Opl Res. Soc. 35(8): 731-
739.
18
[15] Easterly W. and A. Kray, 2000. Small states, small problems ? Income, growth, and
volatility in small states. World Development, 28 (11): 2013-2027.
[16] Hindriks J, S. Peralta and S. Weber, 2008. Competing in taxes and investment under
scal equalization. Journal of Public Economics, 92: 2392-2402.
[17] Kanbur, R., and M. Keen, 1993. Jeux Sans Frontières: Tax competition and tax
coordination when countries di¤er in size. American Economic Review, 83(4): 877
893.
[18] Karp L.S. and J.M. Perlo¤ , 1993. Open-loop and feedback models of dynamic
oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11: 369-389.
[19] Kenny L. and S. Winer, 2006. Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation
into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime.
International Tax and Public Finance, 13(2): 181-215.
[20] Kuznets S.,1960. Economic Growth of Small Nations. In The Economic Consequences
of the Size of Nations, ed. E.A.G. Robinson. Proceedings of a Conference Held by the
International Economic Associations. MacMillan, Toronto.
[21] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1997. Legal determinants
of external nance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150.
[22] Mansoorian A. , G.M. Myers,1993. Attachment to home and e¢ cient purchases of
population in a scal externality econom. Journal of Public Economics, 52: 117-132.
[23] Ogura L.M., 2006. A note on tax competition, attachment to home, and underprovi-
sion of public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 59: 252-258.
[24] Pieretti P. and S. Zanaj, 2011. On tax competition, public goods provision and juris-
dictionssize. Journal of International Economics, 84(1): 124-130.
[25] Read R., 2008. Foreign Direct Investment in Small Island Developing States. Journal
of International Development, 20: 502525.
[26] Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat/ World Bank Joint Task Force on Small
States, 2000. Small States: Meeting Challeges in the Global Economy.
19
[27] Streeten P., 1993. The Special Problems of Small Countries. World Development,
21(2): 197-202.
[28] Trandel G., 1994. Interstate commodity tax dixoerentials and the distribution of resi-
dents. Journal of Public Economics, 53: 435-457.
[29] Tiebout C., 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy,
64: 41624.
[30] Vaillancourt, François,1989. The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the Per-
sonal Income Tax and Payroll Tax System in Canada. Canadian Tax Papers, No. 86.
Canadian Tax Foundation, c1989.
[31] Wilson J.D., 1991. Tax competition with interregional di¤erences in factor endow-
ments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3): 423-451.
[32] Zissimos B. and M. Wooders, 2008. Public Good Di¤erentiation and the Intensity of
Tax Competition. Journal of Public Economics, 92: 1105-1121.
A Appendix
We dene as follows the notion of heterogenous strategic behavior which is used in Dockner
et al. (2000)(Pages 8792).
Denition 1 A 2-tuple (	1;	2) of functions 	1 : [0; 1]  [0;+1) ! R2+ and 	2 :
[0;+1) ! R2+, with 	1 = (	11(S; t);	12(S; t));8(S; t) 2 [0; 1]  [0;+1) and 	2 =
(21(t);	22(t)), is called a heterogenous Strategic Nash Equilibrium if, for each i = 1; 2, an
optimal control path (ai(); Ti) of player i exists and is given by the Markovian Strategy for
player 1: (a1(t); T1(t)) = (	11(S(t); t);	12(S(t); t)) = 	1(S(t); t), and open-loop strategy
for player 2: (a2(t); T2(t)) = (	21(t);	22(t)) = 	2(t).
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The small open economy (the Markovian strategic player) takes the large countrys
(open loop) strategy 	2(t) as given, and hence, faces the following optimization problem:8>>><>>>:
max
a1;T1
Z 1
0
e rt

(S(t)T1(S; t))
1
2   
2
a21(S; t)

;
subject to _S(t) = 

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
  	21(t) 	22(t)
k

:
(7)
The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is
H1(T1; S; a1; 1) =

S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t) 

2
a21(S; t)

+ 1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
 a2(t)  T2(t)
k

where 1 denotes is a costate variable.
The large economy faces the following problem:8>>><>>>:
max
a2;T2
Z 1
0
e rt

((1  S(t))T2(t)) 12   1
2
a22(t)

;
subject to _S(t) = 

	11(S; t) 	12(S; t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k

:
(8)
The large country conjectures that the small economys strategies are	12(S; t) =

k
21(t)
2
S
and 	11(S; t) =

1k
1(t), 8S 2 [0; 1] and t  0. Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian of
the large economy is dened as
H2(T2; S; a2; 2) =

(1  S(t)) 12T
1
2
2 (t) 
1
2
a22(t)

+ 2

a1(t)  T1(t)
k
 a2(t)  T2(t)
k

with 2 its costate variable.
The rst order conditions yield the small economys equilibrium choices T1(t) =

k
21
2
S(t),
a1(t) =
1
k
. The costate variable veries the equation _1(t) = r1  k41 with the transver-
sality condition limt!1 e rt1(t)S(t) = 0.
The optimal choices of the big economy are a2(t) =  2(t)k , T2(t) =

k
22(t)
2
(1 S(t))
with the costate equation
_2(t) = r2   k
42
+
k
4
2
21
: (9)
The associated transversality condition is limt!1 e rt2(t)S(t) = 0.
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Moreover, we can readily check that the maximized HamiltonianH1 (S; 1) andH

2 (S; 2)
are concave with respect to the state variables which guarantees that ai(t); Ti(t) (i = 1; 2)
are optimal paths. Therefore, the large countrys conjecture about the rivals strategy is
optimal. Hence, the solutions 	1(S; t) and 	2(t) for S 2 [0; 1] and t  0 is one pair of
Nash Equilibria.
A.1 Steady states
The long run solutions of the above dynamic system are given as follows:
Proposition 4 At the Nash equilibrium, for any given parameters ; k; r; i; i = 1; 2 , there
is a potential interior steady state
bS = 1
6
p
2
 
kr
 3
2
(
p
2

  1) + 2
3
; (10)
ba1 = 1
2
 
kr
 1
2
; bT1 = kr

bS; ba2 = 1
2
 
2kr
 1
2
; bT2 = 2kr

(1  bS); (11)
with the costate variables b1 = 12  kr 12 ; b2 =  12  k2r 12 . Notice that he steady state is a
saddle point of the canonical system and it is one dimensional locally asymptotically stable.
A.2 Trajectories
The above analysis shows that there is a stable trajectory associated with the dynamic
system. In this subsection, we explore the convergence path to make clear how the steady
state is attained. Taking into account of the initial and transversality conditions, the FOCs
yield the explicit trajectories
1(t) =
1
2

k
r
 1
2
; 2(t) =   1
2

k
2r
 1
2
:
The state trajectory becomes
S(t) = (S(0)  bS)e 3rt + bS (12)
which is the optimal convergence path leading to the steady state. The convergence speed
is 3r.
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A.3 State constraint S(t)  S < 12
Recalling that the small countrys size is constrained (S(t)  S  1
2
), we adapt the
Lagrangian function as follows
L1(T1; S; a1; 1) =
h
S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t)  2a21(S; t)
i
+ 1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
 a2(t)  T2(t)
k

+(S   S):
The above rst order conditions still hold, except the costate variable which now veries
the equation _1(t) = r1  k41 + . Furthermore, we introduce the Kuhn-Tucker condition

 
S   S = 0:
In other words, we have, either S < S with  = 0 or S = S with   0. However, since the
small economys size is constrained by the upper-bound S, we impose that  = 0 whenever
S = S.
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